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“The judiciary must not take on the coloration of whatever may be 
popular at the moment. We are the guardian of rights, and we have 
to tell people things they often do not like to hear.”1 
 
 
  Clerk to the Hon. John W. Kittredge, South Carolina Supreme Court; J.D., cum laude, Elon 
University School of Law, 2013; B.A., with Honors, University of South Carolina—Honors College, 
2009. Special thanks to Charles S. Gibson III, N. Russell Parker, Jr., and Chantelle L. Lytle for their 
enduring friendship and support; to Professors Michael Rich and Enrique Armijo for their guidance 
and helpful insight; to John S. Simmons for years of mentorship and teaching me most everything I 
know about the law; to Rep. Jenny A. Horne for her useful legislative insight and friendship; and to 
Chief Justice Jim Exum for being a wonderful teacher, mentor, and friend. This Article found its 
genesis in a discussion in Chief Justice Exum’s class, and I owe him a debt of gratitude for guiding me 
in the writing process and encouraging me to submit this Article for publication. I would also like to 
thank Justice John W. Kittredge—an exceptional jurist with impeccable integrity—for taking a chance 
on me and mentoring me during my clerkship. The views expressed in this Article are mine alone and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of my employer. 
 1. People v. Diguglielmo, No. 96-1493, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5621 (Westchester Cnty. J. Ct. 
Sept. 17, 2008) (quoting former Chief Justice Rose E. Bird of the Supreme Court of California). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States is in a “new era of judicial elections. Contributions 
have skyrocketed; interest groups, political parties, and mass media 
advertising play an increasingly prominent role; incumbents are facing 
stiffer competition; salience is at an all-time high. Campaign rhetoric has 
changed dramatically, becoming more substantive in content and negative 
in tone.”2 Recently, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that judicial 
candidates have a right to speak about their views on legal and political 
issues that may come before these candidates if they are elected.
3
 This 
invites disaster among the elected judiciary because special interests and 
political forces now have the opportunity to hold judges electorally 
accountable for decisions they render.
4
 “By tying judicial office to success 
in elections, many observers fear judges bend to public opinion rather than 
follow the rule of law.”5 
There is a fundamental tension that underlies judicial elections—the 
tension between judicial independence and judicial accountability.
6
 How 
can we expect judges to be independent arbiters of the law who are not 
influenced by external political forces when we subject these same judges 
to electoral accountability? The answer to this question remains unseen, 
but should at least begin with an explicit acknowledgement that to subject 
judges to elections is to treat them akin to other elected representatives, 
such as legislators and executive officers. It seems that the most likely 
answer to the question is that we simply cannot expect all elected judges to 
 
 
 2. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 267 (2008) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 3. See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (finding that 
Minnesota’s “announce clause,” which forbids candidates in judicial elections from announcing their 
views on legal and political issues, was unconstitutional under the First Amendment). 
 4. See Deborah Goldberg et al., The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal 
Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 506 (2007). “[Republican Party of Minnesota v. White] 
unquestionably opened the door, as both a practical and jurisprudential matter, to forces seeking to 
benefit from highly politicized courts.” Id. 
 5. Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Practice of 
Electing Judges, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 360, 360 (2008). 
 6. See Pozen, supra note 2, at 271. Pozen writes: 
Often, the debate over judicial selection methods is distilled to a single tradeoff: 
independence versus accountability. Elected judges are less independent than appointed 
judges in the sense that the public can vote them out of office if it does not like their 
decisions. (All states that use judicial elections at the initial selection stage also use some 
form of elections at the reselection stage.) Elected judges are more accountable for the same 
reason: [t]here are few disciplinary measures cruder or more powerful than the prospect of 
electoral defeat. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/3
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be independent when they are accountable to the electorate. Even federal 
courts,
7
 including the Supreme Court,
8
 have held that judges are 
representatives in the context of the Voting Rights Act
9—an express 
acknowledgement that an elected judiciary is a representative judiciary.
10
  
This is not to say that all elected judges are incompetent or that there is 
no wisdom in holding elected judges accountable.
11
 Instead, I merely posit 
that elected judges are, necessarily, representatives of the citizens and 
legislators within their jurisdiction. I do not endeavor to reexamine the 
longstanding controversy
12
 over whether appointed judges
13
 are 
 
 
 7. See, e.g., Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275, 278–81 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act applies to judicial elections because judges are “representatives” within the 
meaning of Section 2). 
 8. See, e.g., Houston Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Texas Attorney General, 501 U.S. 419, 425 (1991) 
(holding that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to judicial elections because judges are 
“representatives” within the meaning of Section 2). 
 9. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (1988)). 
 10. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 692 (1995). “Because groups such as blacks and Hispanics are 
underrepresented in some states’ elective judiciaries, these cases effectively require such states to 
redesign their judicial selection systems (absent state interests sufficient to justify the existing 
systems).” Id. 
 11. See Pozen, supra note 2, at 271–72. “Given that judicial independence and public 
accountability are both seen as foundational ideals in the American polity, the tension between them 
makes judicial selection an inherently contestable practice.” Id. 
 12. See Herbert Harley, Taking Judges Out of Politics, 64 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
184, 184 (1916). Harley writes: 
Over a large portion of this country the belief is prevalent that judges, in order to serve the 
public faithfully, must be chosen by popular vote and hold office for a comparatively brief 
term. . . . The offspring of an era of dogmatic optimism, it is fitting that this easy doctrine 
should now be challenged by a principle which reflects the disillusion and skepticism of the 
present time. The new principle denies the ability of the electorate to make wise selection for 
a highly technical branch of work. There can be no dispute of the claim that the work of the 
judge is exceedingly technical. The electorate broadly cannot correctly appraise the relative 
ability of lawyers, and much less can it estimate with accuracy the fitness of members of the 
bar to hold judicial office. 
Id. 
 13. In a sense, however, even appointed judges are representatives. See Barbara A. Perry, Do 
Our Judges “Represent” the People?, 2 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 10, 19. Perry writes: 
Judges can stand as symbols for people in the sense that they resemble them somehow. This 
does not mean that they would decide cases in favor of those people. Doing so would be the 
active representation of constituents that we expect and even demand from members of 
Congress. Rather, judges can passively represent parts of the population. For example, a large 
number of Asian Americans live in California, so a proportionally large number of federal 
judges of Asian heritage there would reflect this segment of the state’s population. 
Id. 
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theoretically preferable
14
 to an elected judiciary,
15
 however the very fact 
that elected judges are representatives of the people renders an elected 
judiciary unsuitable when examined in the broader context of what role 
judges should play in the American political system. 
In Part II I will examine the characteristics of what defines a 
“representative” in a democratic society with a particular emphasis on the 
level to which representatives are accountable to the electorate and the 
extent to which representatives must adopt the public opinion and 
ideology of their constituents.  
In Part III I will explore the role of judges in the American democratic 
process. Because this Article deals primarily with elected (i.e., non-Article 
III) judges, the emphasis will be on state judges in terminal courts of 
appeal—most predominantly state supreme court justices—as these judges 
have the most direct and final say in the law of their states. However, a 
brief history of using impeachment as a method for removing politically 
unpopular appointed Article III judges will precede the central discussion 
about the role of elected judges as representatives. 
Part IV will address Chisom v. Roemer, a United States Supreme Court 
case that determined that the elected justices of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court were “representatives” within the meaning of the 1982 amendments 
to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. After briefly detailing the factual 
background of Chisom and the majority and dissent’s respective 
approaches to this question of statutory interpretation, I will explain why 
the majority came to the right determination that elected judges are 
“representatives” because they are democratically accountable to the 
electorate and are not insulated from the public will due to the real-world, 
pragmatic aspects of electoral politics. 
 
 
 14. In 1916, Herbert Harley, the Secretary of the American Judicature Society, claimed that 
“[w]hile recognizing the fact that many elected judges have been satisfactory, and a few ideally 
qualified to judge, it must be added that the really competent judge has been the exception rather than 
the type.” Id. at 186. 
 15. For an excellent discussion about the role of judicial elections in American representative 
democracy, see Rachel Paine Caufield, The Curious Logic of Judicial Elections, 64 ARK. L. REV. 249 
(2011). Other authors and members of the judiciary have also done commendable work advocating for 
the abolishment of judicial elections. For example, former Chief Justice James Exum of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina has been a longtime advocate of eliminating judicial elections. Chief Justice 
Calls for Elimination of Judicial Elections, WILMINGTON MORNING STAR, Mar. 9, 1989, at 5C, 
available at http://goo.gl/m8CT3H. “The bench is no place for political agendas or crusaders, Exum 
said.” Id. Additionally, Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, after her retirement from the United 
States Supreme Court, has come out vocally against judicial elections. Mark Cohen, Justice O’Connor 
Stumps for Judicial Election Reform, MINN. LAWYER (Sept. 10, 2010), http://minnlawyer.com/ 
minnlawyerblog/2010/09/10/justice-oconnor-stumps-for-judicial-election-reform-in-minn/ (last visited 
July 1, 2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/3
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Part V will explore recent efforts in various states to decrease the size 
of state supreme courts or increase the size of state supreme courts in order 
to change the ideological makeup of the courts. This direct legislative 
impact on the potential makeup of the courts leads to the conclusion that, 
at least to a degree, judges are democratically accountable to the people or 
the people’s elected representatives. 
Part VI will expand upon the basic ideals of the majority opinion in 
Chisom and will demonstrate an ideal case study of how judges are 
democratically accountable for their decisions in states that directly elect, 
or hold retention elections for, state supreme court justices—the 2010 
Iowa Supreme Court retention elections where three justices that voted to 
find bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional were ousted in retention 
elections. I will contrast this with the 2012 Iowa Supreme Court retention 
election, where one of the justices that also voted to find same-sex 
marriage bans unconstitutional was retained in order to determine whether 
the 2012 election was an express rejection of the politicization of an 
elected judiciary. Finally, I will examine what effect these elections have 
on our understanding of judges qua representatives. 
Part VI will examine Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company in order 
to explore the idea that elected judges are not only beholden to the 
electorate, but are also representatives of the business interests that ensure 
that the judges have adequate campaign funding to run for judicial office. I 
intend to demonstrate that elected judges are, indeed, “representatives” of 
powerful business interests that are essential to filling their campaign 
coffers. 
Finally, in Part VIII, I will conclude that elected judiciaries are 
incompatible with the constitutional republic form of government that the 
Framers adopted, and that the only way to ensure that judges are 
independent of bias in their decision-making is to reject judicial elections 
as an acceptable way of choosing or retaining judges. 
II. WHAT IS A REPRESENTATIVE? 
Black’s Law Dictionary provides two definitions for the term 
“representative”: “(1) One who stands for or acts on behalf of another”; 
and “(2) A member of a legislature, [especially] of the lower house.”16 
 
 
 16. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1416–17 (9th ed. 2009). See also Allied Envtl. Servs., PLLC v. 
N.C. Dep’t. of Envtl. & Natural Res., 653 S.E.2d 11, 13 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (adopting the identical 
definition of “representative” from the 7th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary when interpreting a 
North Carolina statute). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This definition mirrors the way the term is used in modern parlance and 
political discourse. In the broadest sense, judges are most certainly 
representatives because they act on behalf of the polity as a whole by 
adjudicating cases and interpreting the law. Indeed, judges are supposed to 
stand on behalf of all of the citizens within their jurisdiction as virtual 
representatives and ensure that the law is applied fairly and equitably 
among the citizenry. This, however, sometimes puts them at odds with 
legislative representatives who may enact legislation that does not comport 
with the Constitution or fundamental principles of common law. This 
creates a quandary for many judges. How must they act when standing on 
behalf of all of society and applying neutral principles of laws leads to the 
invalidation of legislation enacted by duly elected legislators?  
In a review of Professor John Hart Ely’s book Democracy and 
Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, which in part examines the 
application of equal protection ideals by judges, Professor Archibald Cox 
notes that: 
Professor Ely makes a convincing case for the proposition that 
when confined to laws disadvantaging identifiably unpopular 
classes, active judicial review has served—and can serve 
hereafter—to enforce the ideal of representative democracy; it 
functions to invalidate laws that very probably were enacted by 
legislators consciously or unconsciously seeking no important 
general goal but only selfish advantage for the groups to which they 
belong.
17
 
According to Professor Cox, this holds true because “Professor Ely is 
required to incorporate into his definition of representative government the 
concept of virtual representation, which makes it the duty of elected 
legislators to measure in good faith the interests of all classes of society 
and not merely those of themselves and their friends.”18  
This point underscores the analysis of the elected judiciary as 
representatives, but not because elected judges act as fair and impartial 
virtual representatives of all of the classes and people that come before the 
bench—indeed that is the sacrosanct duty of an independent judiciary. 
Instead, elected judges who act in this virtual representative capacity are 
often subject to the confines of recall elections and the influx of money 
from partisan and issue-oriented groups into the campaign coffers of their 
 
 
 17. Archibald Cox, Book Review, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 700, 705 (1981). 
 18. Id. (citation omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/3
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challengers.
19
 In this sense, judges that measure the interests of all classes 
of society rather than the political or moneyed interests that contribute to 
judicial elections are most vulnerable to the same sort of accountability 
that elected legislators and executive officials face—direct representative 
accountability to the people. It is this virtual representation that we should 
hold our elected officials accountable to rather than the prevailing political 
and social norms of individuals and groups with power and influence.  
We must first acknowledge that our elected judges are representative of 
the people of the country—all social, economic, racial, and other classes 
that may not achieve independent majoritarian power—but at the same 
time reject the principle that elected judges should be held directly 
responsible for representing the rights of those classes in lieu of more 
moneyed or influential interests that may only help a judge retain his seat 
rather than benefit society as a whole.
20
 In fact, Professor Cox suggests 
that Professor Ely views courts as virtually representative bodies that are 
compelled to step in to invalidate state laws that violate the equal 
protection clause when legislators abandon their virtual representative 
roles to all of their constituents either unconsciously or consciously in 
favor of a more pragmatic and direct appeal to hegemonic interests with 
stakes in elections.
21
  
III. JUDGES AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 
The Framers of the Constitution deliberately ensured that federal 
judges would hold life tenure, and could only be removed from the bench 
if impeached by the House of Representatives and convicted by the 
Senate.
22
 This singular check on the exercise of power by the federal 
judiciary was designed not to directly punish the offending jurist, but 
instead to eliminate that jurist’s official political power.23 Although 
citizens did not have a direct method to remove counter-majoritarian 
 
 
 19. See id. at 706. “[T]he roots of the principle lie in the aspiration for fairer representation.” Id. 
 20. For a prime example of the conflicting principles of judges acting in a virtual representative 
capacity and the direct representative accountability of those judges in judicial elections to prevailing 
political and social norms, see the discussion in Part VI below about the 2010 Iowa Supreme Court 
retention elections. 
 21. Cox, supra note 17, at 707. “The critical question is to be whether the legislative majority has 
in fact failed to represent an unpopular minority fairly, by consciously or subconsciously failing to 
take its interests into account.” Id. 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 23. Martin Wishnatsky, Taming the Supreme Court, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 597, 651 (2012). 
“[T]he purpose of impeachment is not to secure a criminal conviction against an individual, but rather 
to prevent the further exercise of official power . . . .” Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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federal judges from the bench,
24
 impeachment provided citizens with the 
power to remove unpopular or unrepresentative judges through the 
citizens’ elected representatives.25 In fact, Justice Joseph Story commented 
that impeachment “is a proceeding purely of a political nature.”26 
Alexander Hamilton also noted that impeachment provides a 
“constitutional check” by the legislature against the “danger of judiciary 
encroachments on the legislative authority . . . .”27 Thus, under the 
Hamiltonian view, impeachment would be a remedy for citizens, through 
their elected legislators, to strip the official power of federal judges who 
contravene the express will of the people through the people’s legislature’s 
action or inaction.
28
 In practical terms, “[t]he procedural requirement of a 
House majority and two-thirds assent in the Senate, however, makes 
impeachment for political causes unlikely.”29 Even when the United States 
Supreme Court, or inferior federal courts, issues a controversial decision, 
the backlash does not typically rise to the level of impeachment.
30
 That is 
not to say that the legislature has not tried to remove unpopular and 
unrepresentative judges from the bench,
31
 although the House of 
 
 
 24. The federal judiciary is unique in this regard. Although the federal judiciary protects the 
rights of citizens to speak freely on political issues and debate the merits of various political proposals, 
the judiciary itself has the power to stifle the citizenry’s legislative choice. See AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 37 (2001). 
Amar writes: 
The entire Constitution was based on the notion that the American people stood supreme over 
government officials, who were mere servants of the public, not masters over them. Under 
first principles of popular-sovereignty theory and principal-agent law (which governs, for 
example, employer-employee relations), it was improper—not to mention imprudent—for 
mere public servants in either the federal or the state governments to prohibit their legal 
masters, the sovereign citizenry, from floating political opinions and weighing political 
proposals among themselves. 
Id. 
 25. Wishnatsky, supra note 23, at 652. “The purpose of impeachment is to allow the people as a 
whole through their representatives to address misconduct that affects the national welfare.” Id. 
 26. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 801, at 
272 (Fred B. Rothman 1999) (1833). 
 27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA Publishing 2009). 
 28. See id. 
 29. Wishnatsky, supra note 23, at 655–56 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3). 
 30. Id. at 656. “Although the Court’s decisions often produce outrage from one side of the 
divide, they simultaneously draw admiration from the other. Where the soul of the nation is divided, 
mustering a two-thirds majority to oust judges for ideological reasons seems remote.” Id. (footnote 
omitted). 
 31. See James C. Durham & Judith Johnson, William O. Douglas, in THE SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789–1993, at 394–95 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993) (noting that 
Justice William Douglas was twice threatened with impeachment); Clare Cushman, Abe Fortas, in 
THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789–1993, at 475 (Clare Cushman ed., 
1993) (noting that Abe Fortas resigned after unpopular sentiment led to talk of a potential 
impeachment). For an excellent discussion on the failed nomination of Clement F. Haynesworth to the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2014] HOLDING THE BENCH ACCOUNTABLE 307 
 
 
 
 
Representatives has only impeached one Supreme Court Justice.
32
 
Two of the first judicial impeachments in American jurisprudential 
history shed light on how our earliest citizens and their elected legislators 
viewed the role of judges as representatives of the people. “In 1800, 
President Adams used the power to appoint [judges] in order to pack the 
court [sic]. Thus, the Federalists ‘retreated into the judiciary as a 
stronghold’ as they lost their grip in Congress.”33 Following Adams’ Court 
packing, “Thomas Jefferson and the Jeffersonians embarked on a 
campaign to remove the Federalists by successfully impeaching U.S. 
District Judge John Pickering and then attempting to impeach Associate 
Justice Samuel Chase.”34 
The first target of Jefferson and the Republicans was John Pickering, a 
federal district judge in New Hampshire.
35
 The Republicans accused 
Pickering of being “mentally deranged and frequently intoxicated . . . .”36 
Former Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist summarized the impeachment 
proceedings as follows: 
In March, 1803, the House of Representatives impeached Pickering, 
and almost exactly a year later, the Senate voted to convict him and 
remove him from office. The Senate vote on Pickering’s 
impeachment did not augur well for the independence of the 
judiciary; the vote in the Senate was strictly along party lines, with 
all of the Republicans voting “guilty” and all of the Federalists 
voting “not guilty.”37 
Although “[t]here was no question that Pickering was a disgrace to the 
judiciary and should have resigned,”38 the impeachment of John Pickering 
 
 
United States Supreme Court to fill Abe Fortas’s seat on the bench, see John P. Frank, Are the Justices 
Quasi-Legislators Now?, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 921, 922–23 (1990). 
 32. Samuel Chase is the only Supreme Court Justice to have been impeached by the House of 
Representatives. Chase was acquitted by the Senate. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND 
INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW 
JOHNSON (1992) (providing a detailed account of the impeachment of Justice Chase). 
 33. Tuan Samahon, Impeachment as Judicial Selection?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595, 604 
(2010) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joel Barlow (Mar. 14, 1801), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 223 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905)). 
 34. Id. at 604–05. 
 35. William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 583 (2004) 
[hereinafter Rehnquist, Judicial Independence]. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.; see also Lynn W. Turner, The Impeachment of John Pickering, 54 AM. HIST. REV. 485, 
488 (1949). Turner writes: 
For five years after his appointment to the federal bench, [Pickering] apparently performed 
his few duties competently. But, at the turn of the century, the sixty-three-year-old jurist, who 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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is quite important in examining the confluence of the judiciary and the 
American democratic process.
39
 “In this respect it created a precedent 
which would have altered profoundly our constitutional history had it been 
followed with any degree of consistency by future Senates.”40 One of the 
most important precedents that resulted from the Pickering impeachment 
is the early expansion of what actions were impeachable, because “in order 
to get rid of Pickering, who was certainly neither treasonable, corrupt nor 
criminal, the strict constructionist Republicans had either brazenly to 
violate the Constitution or to give the term ‘misdemeanors’ a connotation 
far more inclusive than its ancient common law meaning.”41 Theoretically, 
this expanded rationale for impeachment could have extended to make 
even appointed, Article III judges representatively accountable for the 
purported wisdom of their decisions to the citizenry and their elected 
legislators.
42
 The subsequent impeachment proceedings of Justice Chase, 
however, altered dramatically the course of legislators using impeachment 
as an accountability measure for federal judges. 
“The day after Judge Pickering was convicted and removed, the House 
voted to impeach Justice Chase. Jeffersonians charged that Justice Chase 
had breached judicial impartiality by making brazenly partisan statements 
from the bench. As a result, they attempted his removal by 
impeachment.”43 Justice Chase was a Federalist and one of six members of 
the Supreme Court, having been appointed by President George 
Washington in 1796.
44
 The Republicans’ charges against Justice Chase 
included his giving a grand jury charge in Baltimore that denounced 
Republican politics and failing to impartially preside over trials against 
 
 
had for some time been increasingly hypochondriac and subject to such eccentricities as an 
unreasoning fear of water travel, showed evidence of definite mental derangement. 
Id. 
 39. See Turner, supra note 38, at 486. Turner writes: 
This prosecution of the judge of the federal district court at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was 
important in our constitutional history for a number of reasons. It was the first impeachment 
to run its full course under the federal Constitution, and the first of a judicial officer. It was, 
furthermore, the first and one of the few successful impeachments if the conviction and 
removal from office of the accused be deemed the criterion of success. 
Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 487. 
 42. See id. at 486. “The fact that [the House that impeached and Senate that convicted 
Pickering’s] apparent interpretations of the Constitution were so soon reversed by the failure to convict 
[Justice Samuel] Chase has made the Pickering case a minor development in the story rather than a 
historic landmark.” Id. 
 43. Samahon, supra note 33, at 605 (citations omitted). 
 44. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, supra note 35, at 584. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/3
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certain individuals aligned with Republican politics.
45
 “[A] partisan House 
majority did impeach Chase and a partisan Senate majority did vote in 
favor of conviction on three of the eight articles.”46 However, the Senate 
votes were not sufficient to satisfy the two-thirds required by the 
Constitution.
47
  
According to former Chief Justice Rehnquist, “[i]f Chase were to be 
removed by the same party line vote as Pickering was, the federal 
judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court of the United States, would 
almost certainly be relegated to junior status among the three branches of 
the federal government with no real independence at all.”48 “As the first 
and last attempt to remove a Supreme Court Justice for his or her political 
opinions, the Chase impeachment and acquittal is a key step in the 
development of the impeachment power” as a tool to impose a 
representative check on the political leanings of Supreme Court Justices.
49
 
The Senate’s acquittal of Justice Chase caused “the abandonment of what 
was generally understood to have been the next step in Republican 
strategy—the impeachment of Chief Justice Marshall. But it also reversed 
the precedent set by the Pickering case, fortunately for a nation whose 
governmental philosophy sets a premium upon the independence of the 
judiciary.”50  
Although the failed impeachment proceedings of Justice Chase settled 
the issue of whether Supreme Court Justices could be held representatively 
responsible for their political musings and partisan leanings,
51
 President 
Richard Nixon attempted to reignite the failed strategy of the Jeffersonian 
Republicans by impeaching members of the Supreme Court that he did not 
favor.
52
 During the Nixon administration, legislators threatened to impeach 
 
 
 45. Id. at 584–85. 
 46. Samahon, supra note 33, at 605 (citation omitted). 
 47. See 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 669 (1805) (noting that the votes to convict Chase on articles of 
impeachment three, four, and eight were 18–16, 18–16, and 19–15, respectively); see also U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 3 (“[N]o Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members [of 
the Senate] present.”). 
 48. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, supra note 35, at 584. 
 49. Jeremy D. Bailey, Constitutionalism, Conflict, and Consent: Jefferson on the Impeachment 
Power, 70 REV. POL. 572, 572 (2008). 
 50. Turner, supra note 38, at 506. 
 51. It is also worth noting, that another representative check, although somewhat impractical, on 
the judiciary is the power of the people to amend the Constitution to overturn an unfavorable Supreme 
Court ruling. See U.S. CONST. art. V. Occasional legislative efforts also attempt to shrink the power of 
the federal judiciary, under Article III, to hear cases involving certain controversial subjects. See, e.g., 
S. 438, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (attempting to strip federal courts of the power to hear cases 
involving school prayer). 
 52. Samahon, supra note 33, at 605. 
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Justice Abe Fortas in 1969 and Justice William Douglas in 1970.
53
 
Although no resolution was introduced calling for Justice Fortas’s 
impeachment, he resigned from the Court, which opened a vacancy for 
President Nixon to fill.
54
 Congressman Gerald Ford led the fight to 
impeach Justice William Douglas in 1970 for various infirmities, 
including “his pursuit of serial monogamy and receipt of money from a 
questionable foundation.”55 The pretext to Nixon and Ford’s actions were 
made quite clear when then-Representative Gerald Ford declared that an 
“impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of 
Representatives considers [it] to be at a given moment in history; 
conviction results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the 
other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the 
accused from office.”56 Democrats eventually “outwitted Republicans 
procedurally and killed the impeachment effort in the House Judiciary 
Committee.”57 The lessons learned from these various impeachment 
efforts—both successful and unsuccessful—are that there are certain 
factions and individuals who believe that even appointed federal judges 
should be held accountable to the electorate for policy-making and 
political actions. Although the legislature has not used such tactics to 
attempt to unpack the Supreme Court since 1970, the danger remains that 
the perfect storm of a President and Congress focused on changing the 
makeup of the Supreme Court could—however slim the possibility may 
be—use impeachment as a representative check on even appointed federal 
judges. Some scholars, including Alexander Bickel, have still suggested 
that even outside of impeachment, constitutional amendment, and 
shrinking the jurisdiction of federal courts, the federal judiciary is still a 
fundamentally representative institution.
58
 
 
 
 53. Id. at 605–06. 
 54. Id. at 606. 
 55. Id. at 607 (citation omitted). 
 56. 116 CONG. REC. H3113-14 (Apr. 15, 1970). 
 57. Samahon, supra note 33, at 607 (citation omitted). 
 58. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 10, at 765–66. Croley writes: 
Bickel’s own resolution of the [countermajoritarian] difficulty was rooted in the idea that the 
federal judiciary is, fundamentally, a representative institution. He begins with the distinction 
between expediency, which implicates the majority’s interests, and principle, which 
implicates its values. The function of the federal judiciary is to protect principle against 
expediency’s attacks. The judiciary, in contradistinction to the other two branches, is to be the 
pronouncer and guardian of values. As the pronouncer and guardian of the polity’s values, the 
judiciary is a representative institution: [i]t represents the majority. 
Id. (citation omitted) (internal marks omitted).  
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However, “most judges are not federal judges, let alone Supreme Court 
Justices. The vast majority of the judges in this country are state judges, 
and most of those state judges have to do something that federal judges 
never have to do: face the voters in order to keep their jobs.”59 “[S]tate 
courts typically are democratically accountable. In most states, citizens 
may register discontent with judicial decisions either by voting judges out 
of office or by amending the state’s constitution to undo unpopular 
constitutional interpretation.”60 As of 2004, approximately ninety percent 
of state general jurisdiction judges are selected by popular elections or 
retention elections
61
 and “[t]hirty-nine states [currently] subject their state 
supreme court justices to some form of elections, either retention, partisan 
or nonpartisan.”62 Three major forms of judicial elections have emerged: 
partisan, nonpartisan, and retention elections.
63
 The United States is 
unique in its adherence to an elected judiciary.
64
 
An examination of the degree to which state-elected judges are 
representatives
65
 of the political zeitgeist and the practicalities of campaign 
politics must begin with an understanding that the state judiciary is quite 
different from the federal judiciary. Indeed, Article III of the United States 
Constitution creates “an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind 
of government,”66 but “[s]tates are not required to adopt separation of 
powers, nor as Judge Posner explained, are they required to ‘imitate the 
separation of powers prescribed for the federal government.’”67  
 
 
 59. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1216–17 (2012) (footnote omitted). 
 60. Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, The United States Supreme Court, and Democratic 
Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 20 (1989) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 61. Pozen, supra note 2, at 266 (citing Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial 
Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1105 (2007)). 
 62. Nicole Mansker & Neal Devins, Do Judicial Elections Facilitate Popular Constitutionalism; 
Can They?, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 27, 29 (2011). 
 63. Melinda Gann Hill, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of 
Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 315, 315 (2001). 
 64. See Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995, 
1996 (1988). “To the rest of the world, the American adherence to judicial elections is as 
incomprehensible as our rejection of the metric system.” Id. 
 65. The most vulnerable to public opinion are judges of the highest state courts who must face 
election. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in 
Highest State Courts, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 79 (1998) (“These are troubled times for 
constitutional democracy in America. Among our political institutions, none are more troubled than 
many of our highest state courts.”). 
 66. Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring).  
 67. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1884 (2001) (quoting Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549, 552 (7th Cir. 
1991)). 
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“‘In a very simple procedural sense, judges are representatives of the 
people.’ They are chosen by elected officials on the basis of their values 
and their political views; they are not chosen by other judges, or by 
competitive examination, or by a panel of elite law professors.”68 Simply 
examining elected judges as direct democratic representatives of the 
people “invite[s] hostility from both the bench and the bar.”69 The reason 
for this conclusion is simple—judges are supposed to be an independent 
branch within our separation of powers governance.
70
 To hold judges 
accountable to the will of the people and the zeitgeist is anathema both 
among judges who feel that they should be free to decide cases without 
external pressures and among lawyers who depend on this independence 
when bringing cases to court.
71
 
As long as states utilize some form of judicial elections, however, there 
must be recognition that this judiciary is an accountable judiciary—
sometimes at the expense of judicial independence. “[A]n ‘accountable 
 
 
 68. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dimensions of Democracy, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1723, 1732 
(2003) (quoting CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF GOVERNMENT 78 (2001)). 
 69. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on 
State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 97 (1997). 
 70. Perhaps this is why  
[p]roponents of limitations on judicial campaigns view voter participation (at least insofar as 
the participation is linked to the voters’ views on legal issues) as something to be avoided, 
lest the judicial candidate feel obligated to decide cases with a view toward the decisions’ 
likely effects on the election returns. 
Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First 
Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y R. 301, 302–03 (2003). 
 71. This sentiment is one of the primary reasons that the framers of the Constitution ensured that 
judges would have immunity from state law defamation claims based on what a judge writes in an 
opinion or says from the bench. See AMAR, supra note 24, at 40. Amar writes: 
Much as Ellsworth, Wilson, and Blackstone argued that certain well-settled background 
principles of the rule of law went without saying, so, too, the Supreme Court has insisted that 
judicial free speech is an implicit element of the basic Anglo-American system of law. As the 
Court explained at the turn of the twentieth century, “a series of decisions, uniformly to the 
same effect, extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present time, established the general 
proposition that no action will lie against a judge for any acts done or words spoken in his 
judicial capacity in a court of justice . . . .” 
Id. (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 495 (1896)). In an 1868 case from the United Kingdom, 
the Court of Exchequer wrote: 
It is essential in all courts that the judges who are appointed to administer the law should be 
permitted to administer it under the protection of the law, independently and freely, without 
favour and without fear. This provision of the law is not for the protection or benefit of a 
malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges 
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of 
consequences. How could a judge so exercise his office, if he were in daily and hourly fear of 
an action being brought against him, and of having the question submitted to a jury whether a 
matter on which he had commented judicially was or was not relevant to the case before him? 
Scott v. Stansfield, 3 L.R. Exch. 220, 223 (1868). 
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judiciary’ typically refers to a judiciary that is accountable to the public in 
a political sense—those judges are representatives of the people. Judges, 
according to this usage are similar to legislators.”72 Indeed, elected judges 
face a number of problems akin to those faced by elected legislators—
undoubtedly representative positions. For example, elected judges are 
prone to 
the appearance of impropriety caused by judges taking money from 
those who appear before them, the threat to judicial independence 
resulting from a judge’s dependence on campaign contributions and 
party support, the reduced perception of impartiality caused by 
statements of judicial candidates on political or social issues, the 
elimination of qualified lawyers who would otherwise be willing to 
serve as jurists, and the loss of public confidence caused by the vile 
rhetoric of judicial campaigns.
73
 
These observations are supported by empirical data of all state supreme 
court judicial elections between 1980 and 1995.
74
 In fact, judicial elections 
during this time frame were just as competitive as elections for the United 
States House of Representatives,
75
 “which is arguably the most highly 
accountable American institution by formal design.”76 
Critics claim that a system of accountable judges invites situations 
where judges are influenced by prevailing social norms rather than the 
black letter of the law. “Advocates of an accountable judiciary argue that 
judges make decisions that affect not merely everyday legal policies, but 
everyday social life—just like legislators.”77 Absent this accountability, 
“judges could turn into renegade legislators, thereby thwarting the will of 
the people.”78 “[M]any political scientists support judicial elections, 
especially partisan judicial elections, especially partisan judicial elections, 
as a way of achieving electoral accountability by judges.”79  
 
 
 72. Martha W. Barnett, The 1997–98 Florida Constitution Revision Commission: Judicial 
Election or Merit Selection, 52 FLA. L. REV. 411, 415 (2000) (citations omitted). 
 73. Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection 
Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 276 (2002). 
 74. See generally Hill, supra note 63, at 315–30 (examining data from 643 state supreme court 
elections between 1980 and 1995). 
 75. See id. at 319. “The fact of the matter, however, is that supreme court justices face 
competition that is, by two of three measures, equivalent if not higher to that for the U.S. House.” Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Barnett, supra note 72, at 415. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Anthony Champagne, Judicial Selection from a Political Science Perspective, 64 ARK. L. 
REV. 221, 222 (2011). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
314 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 6:299 
 
 
 
 
Nicole Mansker, a Law Clerk to U.S. District Court Chief Judge 
Christopher C. Conner and Neal Devins, Goodrich Professor of Law and 
Government at William & Mary Law School, conducted an empirical 
study of state supreme court decisions to determine whether state supreme 
court justices were prone to act in a manner that reflects public opinion 
and democratic accountability.
80
 Mansker and Devins found that “[i]n 
states with contested elections, state justices, like other politicians, ‘have a 
tendency to vote in accordance with perceived constituency preferences on 
visible issues, simply because the failure to do so is politically 
dangerous.’”81 Two prominent patterns emerged. First, on high salience 
issues such as crime, abortion, same-sex marriage, school finance, and gun 
control, state supreme court justices tended to align with public opinion, 
especially in states that elect judges via partisan or nonpartisan elections.
82
 
Second, the authors concluded that: 
With respect to the low salience issues, the courts have incentive to 
turn to business interests and campaign donors, especially given the 
infusion of money into judicial campaigns in recent years. 
Empirical evidence and anecdotal evidence indicate that justices are 
sensitive to the business interests that fund their campaigns (in 
partisan and nonpartisan election states).
83
  
The authors note that even judges acknowledge that these business 
interests and the necessity of campaign donations can influence decisions 
on low salience issues.
84
 
Other scholars have reached similar conclusions that there is “both a 
direct and indirect linkage between state judicial decision making and 
public attitudes.”85 For example, in the context of state supreme court 
rulings on the death penalty, Professors Paul Brace and Brent D. Boyea 
found that “[i]n states that retain their judges electively, a direct effect 
exists which encourages judges to affirm lower court punishments where 
 
 
 80. Mansker & Devins, supra note 62, at 29.  
 81. Id. (quoting Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics 
in the American States, 29 AM. POL. Q. 485, 489–90 (1995)). 
 82. Id. at 29–30. 
 83. Id. at 30. 
 84. Id.; see also Brief for 27 Former Chief Justices and Justices as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 2-3, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (No. 08-22), 2009 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 7 (“Substantial financial support of a judicial candidate—whether contributions to 
the judge’s campaign committee or independent expenditures—can influence a judge’s future 
decisions, both consciously and unconsciously.”). 
 85. Brace & Boyea, supra note 5, at 370. 
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the public is most supportive of capital punishment.”86 Professors Brace 
and Boyea concluded that, “[i]n sum, elections and strong public opinion 
exert a notable and significant direct influence on judge decision making 
in these [death penalty] cases . . . .”87 Perhaps more notably:  
[S]trong death penalty public opinion also played a significant role 
in shaping the ideological character of state supreme courts in states 
with capital punishment where judges faced election. In those states, 
strong public support for the death penalty produced significantly 
more conservative courts than would be predicted by state ideology 
alone. . . . Hence, while the public may only rarely register strong, 
cross-cutting opinions on select issues like the death penalty, in the 
final analysis this may have very broad implications for other areas 
of law. A single highly salient issue might produce broad shifts in 
the basic ideological orientation of courts across much less salient 
issues and have much broader consequences for the interpretation 
and application of laws.
88
 
Ultimately, “[t]he fear is that the quest for office distorts the job of a judge 
either because of the need to make campaign promises or to seek 
campaign funds.”89 
Not all scholars or jurists agree that having public opinion influence 
judicial decision-making is a negative outcome.
90
 Electing judges is 
fundamentally a democratic principle because in a democratic society, the 
 
 
 86. Id. Some scholars have suggested that even the federal court system has also been 
representative of popular opinion on issues involving the death penalty. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 24, 
at 137. Amar writes: 
The [Supreme] Court’s death-penalty jurisprudence offers a suggestive case study. In the late 
1960s, actual executions dropped to zero in America. In response to this apparent national 
consensus, the Court in 1972 seemed to hold the death penalty categorically unconstitutional. 
Over the next four years, both Congress and some thirty-five states representing an 
overwhelming majority of the American population pushed back against this ruling with a 
new round of death-penalty statutes. In response, the Court reconsidered its position and gave 
its blessing to the penalty when the underlying crime was particularly heinous and strict 
procedural safeguards were in place. Since then, the Court has imposed additional substantive 
and procedural limits on capital punishment with a close eye on evolving American practice. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 87. Brace & Boyea, supra note 5, at 370. 
 88. Id. at 370–71. 
 89. Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 594 (2005) (citation omitted). 
 90. See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 2, at 273. “The most fundamental argument made on behalf of 
elective judiciaries is rooted in notions of popular sovereignty and collective self-determination. Its 
premise is enticingly straightforward: [a]s important officials in our democracy, judges should be 
selected by those over whom they hold power.” Id. 
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people should be represented in all branches of their government.
91
 
Electing the judiciary also lends some gravitas and legitimacy to our 
commitment to the democratic process
92—even if that process produces 
undesirable results at times.
93
 Perhaps a representative judiciary is the 
answer to the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” posed by Alexander 
Bickel—the idea that a judiciary that was not elected by the public or 
accountable in any way to the public has the power of judicial review over 
the decisions of democratically elected legislators and executives.
94
  
University of Michigan Law School Professor Steven P. Croley notes 
that “[w]hile democratic values may be advanced by subjecting judges to 
increased electoral scrutiny, certain constitutionalist values may be 
compromised at the same time,” leading to what he terms the “majoritarian 
difficulty.”95 “The majoritarian difficulty asks not how 
unelected/unaccountable judges can be justified in a regime committed to 
democracy, but rather how elected/accountable judges can be justified in a 
regime committed to constitutionalism.”96 Adherence to 
constitutionalism
97
 requires protection of individuals and underrepresented 
classes from the abuse of democratic power by the majority.
98
 However, 
“[w]hen those charged with checking the majority are themselves 
answerable to, and thus influenced by, the majority, the question arises 
how individual and minority protection is secured.”99 Professor Croley 
comes to the reasonable conclusion, which perhaps foreshadowed events 
such as the Iowa Supreme Court retention elections of 2010, that “to the 
extent majoritarian pressures influence judicial decisions because of 
judges’ electoral calculations, elective judiciaries seem, at least at first 
glance, irreconcilable with one of the fundamental principles underlying 
 
 
 91. See Resnik, supra note 89, at 594. “Given democratic preferences for empowerment of 
leaders through the popular will, judicial election—used in many states within the United States—also 
nests easily inside democratic principles.” Id. 
 92. See Pozen, supra note 2, at 273. “Indeed, by expressly honoring our commitment to popular 
sovereignty and public accountability, judicial elections would seem to have a prima facie claim to 
democratic legitimacy (or at least to democratic legitimation) . . . .” Id. 
 93. See id. “A system of periodic majoritarian elections may lead to any number of harms, but it 
is our default means of choosing and constraining those who would speak for us.” Id. 
 94. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962). 
 95. Croley, supra note 10, at 694. 
 96. Id.  
 97. See id. at 704. “Constitutionalism is rooted, in part, in a fear of the consequences of 
majoritarian rule. Constitutionalism thus seeks to limit the scope of democratic power, to circumscribe 
majoritarianism.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 98. See id. at 694. 
 99. Id.  
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constitutionalism.”100 Expanding the reach of the majoritarian difficulty to 
other judicial decision-making aside from constitutional questions, such as 
general legal positions on less salient issues or judicial favoritism towards 
financial benefactors, makes the problem “very real indeed.”101 
The dilemma facing an elected judge is one of significant import to the 
everyday workings of American state judiciaries. The dilemma reveals two 
possible potential outcomes—both perhaps democratic in nature,102 but 
certainly undesirable in the eyes of constitutionalists and proponents of an 
independent judiciary. “Unscrupulous judges seeking reelection would 
have an incentive to compromise the constitutional rights of subsets of 
their judicial electorate who are unpopular, unorganized, or otherwise 
outvoted.”103 On the other hand, scrupulous judges may adhere to their 
constitutional responsibilities and roles as “virtual representatives” of all 
those within their purview, yet be replaced during an election for their 
failure to adhere to the majoritarian pressures unique to democratic 
politics.
104
 It is high time to recognize that state court judges and justices 
face this dilemma on a daily basis. Many of these cases involve low 
saliency issues. Of concern, however, is how elected judges will deal with 
high saliency issues. Will they cede to the popular whim of the day or will 
they stand steadfast with independence and adherence to the Constitution? 
There is, of course, no simple answer to this question. A concluding 
note on rational thought and the self-commitment of conscious actors 
serves to best illustrate the dilemma that continuing to elect judges places 
upon those jurists. Social scientist and political theorist Jon Elster uses an 
example from Homer’s The Odyssey to demonstrate how rational actors 
commit themselves to a future course of conduct.
105
 In Book XII of The 
Odyssey, Ulysses and his crewmembers are preparing to sail past the 
island of the Sirens.
106
 Ulysses knew that if his crewmembers heard the 
Sirens’ beautiful song, they would be drawn to the island and crash the 
 
 
 100. Id. at 696–97 (emphasis omitted). 
 101. Id. at 697–98 (footnote omitted). 
 102. But see FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 202 (1985) (quoting Elbridge Gerry, a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention of 
1787: “The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy.”). 
 103. Croley, supra note 10, at 727. 
 104. See id. “Scrupulous judges, who refuse to respond to majoritarian pressures, may as a result 
be removed from office and replaced with unscrupulous judges. Over time, this phenomenon would 
create a systemic bias in favor of judges most responsive to majoritarian pressures.” Id. (citation 
omitted). 
 105. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36–
37 (1988). 
 106. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 193 (E.V. Rieu trans., Penguin Books 1946). 
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ship.
107
 Therefore, he tells the sailors to plug their ears with wax.
108
 
Ulysses, however, wishes to hear the Sirens’ song so he instructs his crew 
to bind him to the ship’s mast and not release him from his bonds even if 
he begs.
109
 Elster subsequently “argues that the process of self-
commitment—of tying oneself to the mast—is analogous to the 
establishment of a constitution that binds subsequent political action.”110 
“A constitution, Elster argues, is a means by which the political system 
binds itself to desirable policies so that it can resist the temptation to 
abandon or compromise those policies in times of crisis.”111 
While there are critics of Elster’s analogy,112 it provides an excellent 
example of the dilemma faced by elected judges.
113
 These judges are 
required to adhere to the common law, statutory, and constitutional 
principles that define American jurisprudence—forming the proverbial 
mast to which they bind themselves. When elections are impending and 
the judges begin to hear the Sirens’ song of public opinion, should the 
judges stay firm with their preconceived course of conduct—adherence to 
the letter of the law—or should they yield to the tempting songs? Perhaps 
society expects them to yield to the temptress of public opinion at 
democratically convenient times. 
 
 
 107. ELSTER, supra note 105, at 36. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Edward Rubin, Hyperdepoliticization, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 631, 637 (2012) (citing JON 
ELSTER, Ulysses Unbound: Constitutions as Constraints, in ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN 
RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 88–174 (2000)). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See, e.g., id. at 638. Rubin writes: 
When Elster discusses constitution making Ulysses Unbound, however, he implicitly 
incorporates the idea that a society is committing itself to a course of action. The problem 
here is that society is not a self, as just defined, but an academic or rhetorical abstraction. A 
society cannot make decisions and therefore cannot bind itself in the required manner; only 
individuals or institutions within a society can do so. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 113. The work of economist Thomas C. Schelling also provides a similar analogy involving 
Captain Ahab losing a leg in Moby Dick and instructing his crew to cauterize the wound despite his 
protests to the contrary during the procedure. See Thomas C. Schelling, Self-Command in Practice, in 
Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 9 (1984). Schelling writes of the 
Moby Dick episode: 
I do feel sure that if I wanted in such circumstances to endure the pain I would have to rely on 
people who were tough enough in spirit to hold me down, or at least to tie me down. And if 
any violation of the Captain’s express orders constituted mutiny punishable by death, you 
would have to gag Ahab to keep him from screaming “don’t” and thus condemning himself to 
a fatal infection. (Still, if the Captain himself presides over the trial of the mutineers who held 
him when he shouted “stop,” they will be in no danger of his wrath; so anticipating acquittal 
with thanks, they may as well hold him down.) 
Id. 
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Of course, there is one marked difference in the dilemmas faced by 
Ulysses and elected judges—Ulysses knew that he was doomed if he gave 
in to the Sirens’ song.114 The inverse may hold true for elected judges 
facing high salience issues, which may result in a decision that leads their 
ideological opponents to attempt to remove or unseat them. We expect the 
judges to stand firm in their commitment to the letter of the law, yet we do 
nothing to ameliorate the calls of the electoral Sirens.
115
 It is possible, 
however, that we may view society, rather than the judge, as being bound 
to the mast.
116
 In this case society may be doomed if elected judges begin 
to veer off the predestined path of judicial independence. 
Perhaps society merely assents to the blind assumption that even an 
elected judiciary is truly independent and accountable only to the 
principles of the law—ignorant of this assumption when convenience 
dictates disagreement. This explanation, however, seems dubious given 
the United States Supreme Court’s express recognition that judges are 
“representatives”117 and recent examples of efforts to “pack” or “unpack” 
state supreme courts by removing or adding seats to the bench,
118
 
successful efforts to remove state supreme court justices for making 
unpopular decisions,
119
 and the pervasive influence of campaign donations 
to judicial candidates by litigants who appear in their courts.
120
 Going 
forward in addressing reform of the judicial election system, we must keep 
the dilemma faced by Ulysses in mind and ask ourselves whether we want 
our judges to be faced with the choice to compromise their principles in 
order to retain their seat, or to face removal for making the principled, 
though unpopular, decisions that we expect judges to make.  
IV. CHISOM V. ROEMER: THE SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN 
In Chisom v. Roemer, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether the 1982 amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
(“Section 2”) protects the right to vote in state judicial elections.121 The 
petitioners in the case represented a group of black voters in Orleans 
 
 
 114. ELSTER, supra note 105, at 36. 
 115. As discussed below in Part VII, we may actually be giving the Sirens megaphones by 
loosening campaign finance laws. 
 116. To extend the nautical metaphor further, elected judges could be the rudder of the ship. 
 117. See Part IV below. 
 118. See infra Part V. 
 119. See infra Part VI. 
 120. See infra Part VII. 
 121. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383–84 (1991). 
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Parish, Louisiana who were challenging the “method of electing justices of 
the Louisiana Supreme Court from the New Orleans area.”122 “The 
Louisiana supreme court consists of seven justices, five of whom are 
elected from five single-member Supreme Court Districts, and two of 
whom are elected from one multimember Supreme Court District.”123 
Petitioners claimed that the method of electing these justices diluted the 
minority voting strength in violation of Section 2.
124
 The Court was faced 
with the narrow question of whether the 1982 amendment of Section 2 
covered elected judges when it used the word “representatives.”125 
The 1982 amendment to Section 2, as quoted in Chisom, states that: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or 
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote 
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set 
forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b). 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the 
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes 
leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a 
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have 
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate 
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. 
The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected 
to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance 
which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section 
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in 
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
126
 
Congress provided no definition for the term “representatives” when 
codifying the 1982 amendments to Section 2, and the outcome of Chisom 
rested on how that term was to be interpreted by the courts. The Chisom 
Court reasoned that Congress’s choice to use the word “representatives” 
instead of “legislators” in Section 2 indicated “at the very least, that 
Congress intended the amendment to cover more than legislative 
 
 
 122. Id. at 384. 
 123. Id. (citations omitted). 
 124. Id. at 385. 
 125. Id. at 390. 
 126. Id. at 394–95 (quoting 96 Stat. 134 (1982)). 
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elections.”127 Rejecting an argument that “representatives” should only 
apply to legislators and executive officials, the Court adopted the view 
advocated by the Solicitor General, Kenneth Starr, at oral arguments and 
held that “the better reading of the word ‘representatives’ describes the 
winners of representative, popular elections.”128 “If executive officers, 
such as prosecutors, sheriffs, state attorneys general, and state treasurers, 
can be considered ‘representatives’ simply because they are chosen by 
popular election, then the same reasoning should apply to elected 
judges.”129 Such a reading of Section 2 makes sense because “judges do 
engage in policymaking at some level.”130 Indeed, when judges interpret 
statutes, constitutions, or other textual sources, these judges are, in many 
cases, guided by “a well-considered judgment of what is best for the 
community.”131 
The Court expressly recognized that judges do not need to be elected at 
all.
132
 When, however, a state such as Louisiana chooses that it is in that 
state’s best interest to elect the judiciary, the Court must not inquire into 
the wisdom of such a legislative decision.
133
 The Court wrote in Chisom: 
[I]deally public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge’s role 
because the judge is often called upon to disregard, or even to defy, 
popular sentiment. The Framers of the Constitution had a similar 
understanding of the judicial role, and as a consequence, they 
established that Article III judges would be appointed, rather than 
elected, and would be sheltered from public opinion by receiving 
life tenure and salary protection. Indeed, these views were generally 
shared by the States during the early years of the Republic. 
Louisiana, however, has chosen a different course. It has decided to 
elect its judges and to compel judicial candidates to vie for popular 
support just as other political candidates do.
134
 
The Court acknowledged that when a state requires judicial elections, 
there will be a “fundamental tension” between the idealized vision of a 
 
 
 127. Id. at 398–99. 
 128. Id. at 399. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. n.27. “It may be sufficient that the appointee is in a position requiring the exercise of 
discretion concerning issues of public importance. This certainly describes the bench, regardless of 
whether judges might be considered policymakers in the same sense as the executive or legislature.” 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 466–67 (1991). 
 131. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 466. 
 132. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 400. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. (citation omitted). 
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judge as an independent arbiter of the law and the “real world of electoral 
politics . . . .”135 This tension necessitates that elected judges cannot be 
totally indifferent to the popular will.
136
 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy dissented 
from the majority’s holding that “representative” embodied elected 
judges.
137
 Contrary to the majority’s focus on the purpose of the 
amendment to Section 2 and the pragmatic necessities of being required to 
run for public office, the dissent instead focused on a plain meaning 
reading of the term “representative.”138 After a brief summary of the 
history of the 1982 amendments, the dissent criticized the majority’s 
expedition to find a definition of “representative” that includes elected 
judges.
139
 Justice Scalia stated that: 
[O]ur job is not to scavenge the world of English usage to discover 
whether there is any possible meaning of “representatives” which 
suits our preconception that the statute includes judges; our job is to 
determine whether the ordinary meaning includes them, and if it 
does not, to ask whether there is any solid indication in the text or 
structure of the statute that something other than ordinary meaning 
was intended.
140
 
Justice Scalia stated that finding that “representatives” means those who 
“are chosen by popular election” would include “the fan-elected members 
of the baseball all-star teams . . . .”141 Congress could not have intended 
such a reading when it amended Section 2. Instead, “the word 
‘representative’ connotes one who is not only elected by the people, but 
who also, at a minimum, acts on behalf of the people. Judges do that in a 
sense—but not in the ordinary sense.”142 Judges must represent the Law, 
while prosecutors represent the people.
143
 The dissent, however, did not 
state that a judge could not be a representative if a state so desired, but 
instead only found that a legislator in 1982 who drafted the amendments to 
Section 2 would have relied on an ordinary meaning of “representatives” 
that did not include judges.
144
 Therefore, the greatest division between the 
 
 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 404 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 139. Id. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 144. Id. at 411 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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dissent and the majority was not whether judges could be representatives 
in their elective capacities—in other words whether an elected judge is 
accountable to his constituents—but instead what was intended in the 
specific context of the 1982 amendments to Section 2.  
In light of the discussion in Parts II and III about what role elected 
judges have in a representative democracy, the majority in Chisom came to 
the proper conclusion that the definition of “representatives” in Section 2 
includes elected judges for the primary reason that “judges who have been 
chosen by the people and are directly accountable to the people are in a 
very real and practical sense representatives . . . [and] the candidates for a 
seat on the Louisiana supreme court are involved fully in the political 
process in the very basic sense of getting themselves elected to public 
office.”145 After all, “judges do engage in policymaking at some level.”146 
Therefore, treating elected judges as we would other representatives may 
not, after all, be such a negative thing
147
 if we find it “desirable, as a 
matter of democratic self governance, for a ‘free people to choose those 
officials who exercise policy-making authority.’”148 
V. PACKING AND UNPACKING THE COURT: CHANGING THE MAKEUP OF 
STATE SUPREME COURTS TO ALTER THE IDEOLOGICAL BALANCE 
Even in states where judges are appointed or elected by the legislature 
or other means, there are very real concerns that these appointed judges 
will be representatives of, and accountable to, the political forces that 
appoint them to the bench. In recent years, there have been efforts in many 
states to increase or reduce the size of state supreme courts by self-
interested legislators. For example, in South Carolina, a state where the 
General Assembly elects judges to the family courts,
149
 circuit courts,
150
 
courts of appeals,
151
 and supreme court,
152
 Michael A. Pitts, a Republican 
 
 
 145. Oral Argument, Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (No. 90-757), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_757 (Kenneth W. Starr on behalf of the United 
States).  
 146. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 399 n.27 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 466–67 (1991)). 
 147. Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way of Selecting Judges—Except All the Others that 
Have Been Tried, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 267, 268 (2005) [hereinafter Dimino, Worst Way]. “Democracy 
may indeed be the worst method of choosing judges . . . except for all the other ones.” Id. (ellipsis in 
original) (footnote omitted). 
 148. Pozen, supra note 2, at 274 (quoting Dimino, Worst Way, supra note 147, at 268). 
 149. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-80 (West 2013). 
 150. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 13. 
 151. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 8. 
 152. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3. 
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legislator,
153
 introduced a bill to increase the size of the South Carolina 
Supreme Court from five to seven justices.
154
 Less candidly, Republican 
members of the North Carolina Senate Rules committee attempted to 
expand the breadth of a pending Senate Bill, SB 10, to increase the size of 
the North Carolina Supreme Court from seven members to nine 
members.
155
 The proposed Senate Bill would have allowed the “newly 
elected Republican governor to fill the new vacancies.” Similar bills have 
failed in Arizona,
156
 Florida,
157
 Iowa,
158
 and many other states.
159
 
In other states, legislatures have sought to decrease the size of supreme 
courts in reaction to rulings or in order to influence the policy of the state. 
Most prominently, there was an effort to shrink the size of the Montana 
Supreme Court from seven to five in 2011.
160
 The author of the bill, Rep. 
Derek Skees, was quite candid about his motive for passing the 
legislation.
161
 Skees stated that:  
All of us want tort reform, well maybe not all of us. I surely want it 
and a lot of folks I talk to want it. So how do we get tort reform? I 
would suggest that if we took the Supreme Court from 7 down to 5, 
they have a higher workload, guess who becomes our ally in tort 
reform? The Supreme Court.
162
 
 
 
 153. Representative Michael A. Pitts, S.C. LEGISLATURE, http://www.scstatehouse.gov/member. 
php?code=1481533914 (last visited July 1, 2014). 
 154. H.R.J. Res. 3090, Gen. Assemb., 120th Sess. (S.C. 2013–14). 
 155. Bill Raftery, Surprise Effort by NC Senate GOP to Expand Supreme Court Loses After House 
Balks, Likely to Return, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Feb. 5, 2013), http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2013/02/ 
05/surprise-effort-by-nc-senate-gop-to-expand-supreme-court-loses-after-house-balks-likely-to-return/ 
(last visited July 1, 2014). 
 156. See S.B. 1481, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (requiring the state supreme court to 
increase from five to seven justices). 
 157. H.J.R. Res. 7111, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011) (as introduced) (requiring the seven-member 
supreme court to be divided into two separate five-member civil and criminal supreme courts and the 
transfer of Democratically appointed justices to the Criminal Supreme Court). 
 158. H.J.R. 2012 (Iowa 2010) (requiring the supreme court to increase from seven members to 
nine members following the Iowa Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of same-sex marriage). 
 159. Bill Raftery, Over a Dozen Efforts to Alter Number of State Supreme Court Justices, Almost 
All Related to “Packing” the Courts, in Last Several Years, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2013/02/05/over-a-dozen-efforts-to-alter-number-of-state-supreme-court-
justices-almost-all-related-to-packing-the-courts-in-last-several-years/ (last visited July 1, 2014) 
(discussing Florida, Georgia, Michigan, South Carolina, Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Nevada, Arizona, 
Florida, Montana, and North Carolina). 
 160. Bill Raftery, Plan to Shrink Montana Supreme Court: Designed to Force the Court into Tort 
Reform and out of Redistricting Lawsuits?, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Jan. 18, 2011), http://gaveltogavel.us/ 
site/2011/01/18/plan-to-shrink-montana-supreme-court-designed-to-force-the-court-into-tort-reform-
and-out-of-redistricting-lawsuits/ (last visited July 1, 2014). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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A member of the Republican Party also spoke to Republican members of 
the Montana House Judiciary Committee, stating:  
We have redistricting and we need a tightened down [the] Supreme 
Court in order to achieve that. So take control of the reins of the 
Supreme Court, show them who is in charge, and remember that 
with redistricting, how we (Republicans) have been treated by the 
Supreme Court in the past.
163
 
Similarly in Washington, after the state supreme court there invalidated a 
state initiative that would have required a two-thirds vote in the legislature 
to pass any tax increase, state legislators were upset with the state supreme 
court’s 6–3 ruling.164 Six days after the ruling, Republican senators 
introduced a bill that would have reduced the Supreme Court from nine to 
five.
165
 The language of the bill made clear that it was initiated in reaction 
to the ruling—even citing the case by name in the text of the measure.166 
The measure would have, quite absurdly, required the nine justices to 
“meet in public” and draw straws to decide which five justices could 
remain on the Supreme Court.
167
 
“All of these efforts threaten judicial independence not just because of 
the motives behind them but because of the message they send to judges, 
to litigants, and to plain, old ordinary citizens.”168 This message is clear—
if judges render decisions that are unpopular with the people or their 
elected legislative representatives, the judges are susceptible to losing their 
jobs or dilution of their influence on the state supreme court by other 
judges with contrary political views. The fact that most of these efforts to 
change the makeup of the supreme courts have failed is irrelevant for the 
determination of whether society expects the judiciary to act as 
representatives. Clearly, there is some level of accountability to the 
people, the legislature, or the state executive with all judges who have less 
than life tenure. The people and the legislature are both free to change the 
makeup of their state supreme courts subject only to constitutional 
restraints. Even when a state constitution limits changes to the makeup of 
the supreme courts, there is still a level of accountability because the 
 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Andrew Cohen, A “Court Unpacking Plan” Threatens Judicial Independence, BRENNAN 
CENTER FOR JUST. (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/“court-unpacking-plan”-
threatens-judicial-independence (last visited July 1, 2014) [hereinafter Cohen, Unpacking]. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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legislature or the people can amend the state constitution to permit a 
changed court if they so desire. The inevitable conclusion is that, at least 
to a degree, these high court judges are representatives—or at the very 
least, that self-interested legislatures and the public expect judges to act as 
their representatives lest they be removed from the bench. 
VI. DIRECT DEMOCRACY: RETENTION ELECTIONS AND THE IOWA 
SUPREME COURT  
In 1977, California Governor Jerry Brown appointed Rose Elizabeth 
Bird as the first woman Chief Justice on the Supreme Court of 
California.
169
 “For a high court judge, Bird was youthful and 
inexperienced. She was 40 years old and had entered the profession only 
twelve years before her appointment to the highest legal office in the 
state.”170 The majority of Bird’s work prior to appointment was as a public 
defender and administrator of the California Agriculture and Services 
Agency.
171
 Though Bird secured her seat on the Supreme Court of 
California via executive appointment and confirmation by the Commission 
on Judicial Appointments, she was required to run in the 1978 general 
retention election.
172
 “Bird became the first Justice sitting on her court 
since the institution of the retention election in 1934 to evoke 
opposition.”173 Some of this opposition was related to her administrative 
style and lack of experience—some criticism even coming from other state 
judges.
174
 Much of the opposition was rooted, however, in partisan and 
ideological opposition to Chief Justice Bird.
175
 Bird was only retained with 
 
 
 169. Carrington, supra note 65, at 81. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 82. 
 174. Id.  
 175. See id. Carrington writes: 
A conservative state senator raised a campaign fund, much of it from the gun owners’ lobby, 
to challenge her moral fitness as a judge, alleging that she was soft on crime. He deployed 
electronic media to make a scurrilous and untruthful personal attack on her of the sort that has 
become a signature of contemporary American politics. His media blitzkrieg called attention 
to her share in the responsibility for her court’s holding that repeated, forced insertions of a 
penis into the mouth of a female rape victim does not constitute a crime entailing “great 
bodily injury,” as the jury in a celebrated case had been instructed. Bird’s separate concurring 
opinion had emphasized what she denoted as the “plain meaning” of the controlling statute, 
which she perceived, not unreasonably, to enhance punishment only when a crime victim 
experienced enduring physical disability. One of the television ads prepared at the direction of 
her assailant portrayed an apparent rape victim and suggested that her rapist would soon be on 
the streets again if Bird were retained as Chief Justice.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
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a slight majority of votes—receiving only 51.7% of the vote.176 This, 
however, is not the end of her storied history with public accountability 
and judicial independence. 
In 1986, Bird was again up for retention,
177
 and was defeated, along 
with two of her colleagues on the Supreme Court of California.
178
 “Capital 
punishment was the chief issue in that election, and the anti-retention 
campaign was financed with seven million dollars raised mostly in small 
contributions from individual citizens affronted by Chief Justice Bird’s 
obstinacy on that issue.”179 The state senator that organized the earlier 
effort to recall Chief Justice Bird in 1978 celebrated Bird’s removal, 
because “[d]isapproval of several reversals of criminal convictions was in 
his view ample reason to unseat a member of the court.”180 These events 
set an early precedent for opponents of judicial opinions—even if those 
opinions were based on valid and correct legal reasoning. This trend of 
judicial accountability continues today, and holding elected judges 
responsible as representatives of the people, rather than as representatives 
of the law, continues to pose a grave threat to judicial independence. 
Rational, self-interested jurists appointed to replace ousted judges would 
very likely at least lend some thought to whether they wanted to expose 
themselves to the same electoral vulnerabilities by voting in accord with 
their predecessors. 
The most recent example
181
 of this threat to judicial independence 
occurred in Iowa in 2010. The 2010 Iowa Supreme Court retention 
election provides a clear example of the effect that popular opinion has 
upon future judicial decision-making. In Iowa, “the Governor appoints 
judges from a list of candidates put forth by an independent nominating 
committee. After certain periods of time, the public then votes in retention 
elections on whether the judges appointed by the Governor should remain 
 
 
 176. Id. at 83. 
 177. Id. There was also an unsuccessful effort to remove her in 1982. Id.  
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. 
 180. Id.  
 181. There have also been other high profile retention elections in recent years. See, e.g., James 
Sample, Retention Elections 2.010, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 383, 384 (2012). Sample writes: 
Illinois Chief Justice Thomas Kilbride faced a well-funded anti-retention effort—this one 
based on perceived anti-business rulings, but Kilbride aggressively raised more than $1 
million from political parties, unions, and stakeholders before the bench, resulting in what the 
Chicago Tribune described as “a $3 million fight over a name most Illinoisans didn’t even see 
on the ballot.” Kilbride retained his seat. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Monique Garcia, State Supreme Court Justice Wins Retention Battle, 
CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 2, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-11-02/news/ct-elect-kilbride-
20101102_1_ jury-aw ards-retention-battle-constitutionality-of-state-law). 
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in office.”182 Typically these retention elections have been uneventful and 
essentially non-political.
183
 But prior to the 2010 Iowa Supreme Court 
retention elections, the Iowa Supreme Court faced an issue that would 
divide the electorate—gay marriage. 
In Varnum v. Brien, the Iowa Supreme Court decided whether a state 
statute
184
 that limited civil marriage to be between a man and a woman 
was constitutional.
185
 In a unanimous opinion, the court found that the 
Iowa marriage statute violated the equal protection clause of the Iowa 
Constitution.
186
 The court characterized the plaintiffs in the underlying 
lawsuit as twelve “responsible, caring, and productive individuals” who 
were only different from most Iowans in one way—“[t]hey are sexually 
and romantically attracted to members of their own sex.”187 The Iowa 
court noted that it had a profound duty to protect the right of individuals 
and found its responsibility “is to protect constitutional rights of 
individuals from legislative enactments that have denied those rights, even 
when the rights have not yet been broadly accepted, were at one time 
unimagined, or challenge a deeply ingrained practice or law viewed to be 
impervious to the passage of time.”188 Applying intermediate scrutiny,189 
the court found that the Iowa marriage statute did not substantially further 
any of the government’s proffered190 objectives.191 Concluding its 
constitutional analysis, the Iowa Supreme Court reiterated its 
constitutionally-mandated duty:  
We are firmly convinced the exclusion of gay and lesbian people 
from the institution of civil marriage does not substantially further 
any important governmental objective. The legislature has excluded 
a historically disfavored class of persons from a supremely 
important civil institution without a constitutionally sufficient 
 
 
 182. J. Alexandra Gonzales, The Repercussions of Losing the Right to Respond: Why Matching 
Funds Should Be Constitutional for Judicial Elections Even after Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 509, 540 (2012) (citations omitted). 
 183. Id. at 541. 
 184. IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2 (West 2012). 
 185. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 186. Id. at 872. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 876. 
 189. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory 
classification must be substantially related to an important governmental objective.”). 
 190. The government’s proffered objectives were: (1) to maintain traditional marriage; (2) the 
promotion of an optimal environment for children; (3) the promotion of procreation; (4) the promotion 
of stability in heterosexual relationships; and (5) the conservation of resources. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d 
at 898–903. 
 191. Id. at 904. 
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justification. There is no material fact, genuinely in dispute, that can 
affect this determination. We have a constitutional duty to ensure 
equal protection of the law. Faithfulness to that duty requires us to 
hold that Iowa’s marriage statute . . . violates the Iowa Constitution. 
To decide otherwise would be an abdication of our constitutional 
duty. If gay and lesbian people must submit to different treatment 
without an exceedingly persuasive justification, they are deprived of 
the benefits of the principle of equal protection upon which the rule 
of law is founded.
192
 
Reaction to the Iowa court’s decision was mixed. Iowa Senate Majority 
Leader Mike Gronstal and House Speaker Pat Murphy issued a joint 
statement saying that “[w]hen all is said and done, we believe the only 
lasting question about today’s events will be why it took us so long.”193 
Other Iowa politicians were disappointed with the court’s decision. For 
example, Senate Republican Leader Paul McKinley issued a statement 
criticizing the court’s ruling.194 
As a result of the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Varnum, the 
upcoming judicial retention elections took center-stage
195
:  
Bob Vander Plaats spearheaded an effort to remove three of the 
justices who took part in the opinion who were up for retention 
election the following November. Vander Plaats created an 
organization called Iowa for Freedom that embodied his evangelical 
social conservatism. Vander Plaats’ anti-retention campaign was 
successful due to funding his organization received from the 
American Family Association (AFA).
196
 
The AFA and Vander Plaats “used the campaign to flood money into the 
election as a method to voice [their] opposition to judicial activism: 
‘[s]tate judges would know their jobs would be at stake when they ruled 
against the values social conservatives cherished.’”197 Vander Plaats’ 
 
 
 192. Id. at 906. 
 193. Chad Nation, Iowa Supreme Court: Gay Marriage Ban Illegal, DAILY NONPAREIL (Apr. 3, 
2009), http://m.nonpareilonline.com/archive/iowa-supreme-court-gay-marriage-ban-illegal/article_ 
49a88834-030b-507f-b475-66b62f126083.html (last visited July 1, 2014).  
 194. See id. (“I believe marriage should only be between one man and one woman, and I am 
confident the majority of Iowans want traditional marriage to be legally recognized in this state . . . .”). 
 195. Gonzales, supra note 182, at 541. 
 196. Id. (citations omitted) (internal marks omitted). 
 197. Id. at 541–42 (quoting Patrick Caldwell, Disorder in the Court, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 2011, at 
48). 
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campaign to oust the three Iowa Supreme Court Justices
198
 was purely 
punitive in nature.
199
 Vander Plaats and Iowa for Freedom campaigned 
against the retention of the justices in a typical, grassroots political 
manner.
200
 Many churches and other groups contributed to the cause.
201
 
“It became readily apparent that the individual justices were 
unprepared for an onslaught of such magnitude. They were ill-equipped to 
fight the efforts directed at their removal.”202 Former United States 
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor came to Iowa to assist in 
preserving judicial independence and several groups were formed (though 
not by the justices themselves) to support the retention of the justices.
203
 
Judicial independence, however, did not rule the day. The three justices up 
for retention “received only about forty-six percent of the vote and were 
not retained.”204  
During the 2012 retention election, “[p]residential candidate Rick 
Santorum and Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal stumped in Iowa to defeat 
Justice David Wiggins, one of the other four members of the court who 
had signed on to the same-sex marriage decision.”205 Similar retention 
opposition has occurred, unsuccessfully, in Florida and Arizona.
206
 
Individuals and organizations even sought ballot initiatives to water down 
the merit selection of judges in Arizona, Florida, and Missouri.
207
 After a 
similar failed retention election of Tennessee Supreme Court Justice 
Penny White,
208
 the “governor proclaimed, ‘[s]hould a judge look over his 
 
 
 198. The judges up for retention were Chief Justice Marsha Ternus and Justices Michael Streit and 
David Baker. Bert Brandenburg & Matt Berg, The New Storm of Money and Politics around Judicial 
Retention Elections, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 703, 708 (2012). 
 199. Id. at 707–08. “The retention election would provide outraged citizens an opportunity to 
punish the justices by removing them from the bench.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 200. See id. at 708. “The group functioned like a typical grassroots political campaign, using 
mailers, phone calls, door-to-door visits, and even a bus tour. It ran television advertisements that 
adopted the mantra of ‘activist judges’ and suggested that if the court could take away traditional 
marriage, other rights and freedoms could come next.” Id. 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. at 708–09. 
 204. Id. at 709 (citations omitted).  
 205. Bert Brandenburg, Beating Back the War on Judges, SLATE (NOV. 12, 2012, 1:06 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/11/judicial_elections_in_2012_ 
voters_rejected_the_politicization_of_the_courts.html (last visited July 1, 2014). 
 206. Id.  
 207. See id. “The result? Bipartisan backlash. The ballot measures were defeated by enormous 
margins, exceeding 70 percent in Arizona and Missouri, and by almost two-thirds of Floridians.” Id. 
 208. See John P. Freeman, Protecting Judicial Independence, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 511, 522 
(2012). Freeman writes: 
Similarly, Justice Penny White was removed from Tennessee’s Supreme Court following a 
negative retention vote, courtesy of a coalition of conservative groups. Justice White’s 
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shoulder to the next election in determining how to rule on a case? I hope 
so. I hope so.’”209 
VII. MONEY MATTERS: CAPERTON V. A.T. MASSEY COAL COMPANY 
In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, the United States Supreme 
Court addressed an appeal from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia, which had reversed a trial verdict of $50 million against A.T. 
Massey Coal Company.
210
 The West Virginia Court’s decision was 3–2, 
and one of the judges in the majority that voted to reverse the verdict, 
Justice Brent Benjamin, refused to recuse himself from the case despite 
receiving a tremendous amount of monetary support in his election 
campaign from Don Blankenship, the chairman of A.T. Massey Coal 
Company.
211
 After the trial court’s verdict but prior to the appeal in the 
underlying cases, Blankenship had donated the statutory maximum to 
Benjamin’s campaign to replace Justice Warren McGraw, who was up for 
reelection at the time.
212
 Blankenship also donated almost $2.5 million to 
an organization, “And For The Sake Of The Kids,” which opposed 
McGraw and supported Benjamin.
213
 Finally, Blankenship spent over 
$500,000 on independent expenditures in support of Benjamin.
214
 All told, 
Blankenship’s contributions to Benjamin’s campaign “were more than the 
total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters and three times the 
amount spent by Benjamin’s own committee.”215 Despite receiving this 
enormous financial support from Blankenship, Justice Benjamin refused to 
recuse himself when A.T. Massey Coal Company appealed the $50 
million verdict of the trial court and voted to overturn the verdict.
216
 In a 
 
 
removal was payback for having joined other justices in narrowly interpreting standards 
applied in a single death penalty case. Conservative activists bent on changing the face of the 
judiciary are not bashful about taking on judges who do not share the groups’ social or 
political view, as reflected by Justice White’s defeat at their hands. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 209. Devera B. Scott et al., The Assault on Judicial Independence and the Uniquely Delaware 
Response, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 217, 231 (2009). 
 210. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009). 
 211. Id. at 873–75. 
 212. Id. at 873. 
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. After initially reversing the trial court verdict, the Court granted Caperton’s petition for a 
rehearing and two justices recused themselves from the case—one who had vacationed with 
Blankenship in the French Riviera while the appeal was pending and another who was critical of 
Blankenship’s involvement in state supreme court elections. Id. at 874–75. Despite this, Benjamin not 
only refused to recuse himself, but also served in the capacity of acting Chief Justice and chose the two 
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concurring opinion, Justice Benjamin claimed that he had no “direct, 
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” in the case.217 
Justice Kennedy, writing for a five-member majority of the United 
States Supreme Court, held that Justice Benjamin should have recused 
himself from the case as a matter of due process.
218
 The Court did not 
address whether there was actual bias, an inherently subjective and private 
inquiry, and instead asked “whether, ‘under a realistic appraisal of 
psychological tendencies and human weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a 
risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be 
forbidden . . . .’”219 Although the Court noted that not every campaign 
contribution by a litigant or attorney would create a likelihood of absolute 
bias, the sheer magnitude of Blankenship’s contributions raised a serious 
objective and reasonable concern that Justice Benjamin would be biased in 
favor of A.T. Massey Coal Company.
220
 Indeed, “when a person with a 
personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate 
influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the 
judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent,” there 
is a serious risk of actual bias.
221
 The situation faced by the Court was so 
extraordinary, and the risk that Justice Benjamin would represent the 
interests of A.T. Massey Coal Company was so high, that the Constitution 
required Justice Benjamin to recuse himself from the case.
222
 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, 
authored a dissent that rejected the majority’s claim that Blankenship’s 
donations were so immense that there was an objective and reasonable fear 
that Justice Benjamin would represent Blankenship’s interests.223 Roberts 
emphasized that there is a “presumption of honesty and integrity in those 
serving as adjudicators.”224 Roberts noted that the Due Process Clause 
only required recusal in two situations: (1) when the judge has a “direct, 
personal, substantial pecuniary interest;”225 and (2) “when a judge presides 
over a criminal contempt case that resulted from the defendant’s hostility 
 
 
judges to replace the recused justices. Id. at 875. The state supreme court again overturned the jury 
verdict by a vote of 3–2. Id.  
 217. Id. at 876 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986)). 
 218. Id. at 872. 
 219. Id. at 883–84 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
 220. Id. at 884. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 887. 
 223. Id. at 890 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 224. Id. at 891 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
 225. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)). 
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towards that judge.”226 Essentially, Roberts argued that even though 
recusal may have been wise and there may have been a risk of personal 
bias, the Constitution did not compel recusal for these reasons.
227
 Finally, 
Roberts claimed that the majority’s standard was unworkable and left a 
number of questions bearing on the risk of actual prejudice up to the trial 
courts—in fact listing forty example inquiries that a trial court might make 
to determine whether there was a risk of the judge representing the views 
of the litigant or attorney that had financially supported his or her 
campaign.
228
 
Justice Scalia also dissented separately and claimed that the majority’s 
decision emboldens the “perception that litigation is just a game, that the 
party with the most resourceful lawyer can play it to win, [and] that our 
seemingly interminable legal proceedings are wonderfully self-
perpetuating but incapable of delivering real-world justice.”229 Scalia 
stated that the majority continued “its quixotic quest to right all wrongs 
and repair all imperfections through the Constitution.”230 
The Caperton Court addressed a relatively narrow question of whether 
the Constitution dictated recusal when there was an appearance of actual 
bias, but all members of the Court recognized, to a degree, that extensive 
campaign donations to a judge running for office do pose a risk that the 
judge will then represent the donor’s interests in rendering judicial 
decisions. Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, lent some credibility to the 
claim that judges should be presumptively thought of as honest and 
unbiased,
231
 but the facts of the Caperton case raise serious concerns about 
whether elected judges will engage in “judicial favoritism”—in which the 
judge has a preference for litigants or attorneys who donated large sums to 
the judge’s campaign.232 The bizarre story behind Blankenship’s financing 
of Justice Benjamin’s campaign and Justice Benjamin’s refusal to recuse 
himself were so compelling that they became the plot of a John Grisham 
novel.
233
 Although the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals again 
 
 
 226. Id. at 892 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 
(1971). 
 227. Id. at 893 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 228. Id. at 893–98 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 229. Id. at 903 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 891 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 232. Mary A. Celeste, The Debate Over the Selection and Retention of Judges: How Judges Can 
Ride the Wave, 46 CT. REV. 82, 88 (2009), available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/publications/courtrv/cr46-
3/CR%2046-3%20Celeste.pdf (last visited July 1, 2014). 
 233. Michael A. Behrens, Citizens United, Tax Policy, and Corporate Governance, 12 FLA. TAX 
REV. 589, 610 (2012); JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008). 
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overturned the $50 million verdict against A.T. Massey Coal Company on 
remand with Justice Benjamin recusing himself,
234
 the case brought the 
issue of “judicial favoritism” to the forefront of scholarship and the news 
media.
235
 Some states instituted reforms to prevent the appearance of bias 
from a judge sitting on a case with litigants or attorneys who had financed 
the judge’s campaign.236 This fear that elected judges will represent the 
views of their donors is heightened in the new era of less stringent, post-
Citizens United
237
 campaign finance laws.
238
 Perhaps one of the most 
promising trends in state judicial elections is growing support for public 
financing of judicial elections.
239
 This development would almost certainly 
eliminate fears that elected judges would represent pervasive moneyed 
interests because all campaign funds would come from a public fund. 
VIII. THE ANSWER: ELIMINATE ELECTIONS 
It is high time that we revert back to the approaches that the states took 
to the judiciary during the early years of our Republic. All of the original 
thirteen colonies employed some form of judicial appointment.
240
 “[W]ith 
the new concept of sovereignty in the populace as a whole, it was 
 
 
 234. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 2009). 
 235. Scholars had discussed the issue of the pervasive influence that money had on judicial 
campaigns for many years prior to the Caperton decision. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 10, at 691–92. 
Croley writes: 
[T]he debate about “getting judges out of politics” emerges almost perennially, fueled in large 
part by controversies surrounding elected state judges. But that debate (whose participants, 
incidentally, often are sitting or former state judges or justices themselves) is confined largely 
to issues such as the propriety of judicial campaigning and the effects of attorney 
expenditures on judicial objectivity. Some argue, for example, that because contributions to 
judicial campaigns by individuals who are “repeat players” before a judicial candidate render 
the institution corrupt, elective judiciaries should be eliminated. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 236. See Press Release, Just. at Stake Campaign, Citizens United Called Grave Threat for 
America’s Courts (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press-releases-
16824/?show=news&newsID=6669 (last visited July 1, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release]. Justice at 
Stake wrote: 
In December[, 2009], Wisconsin became the third state to provide public financing for 
appellate court races, so that judicial candidates would not have to seek money from those 
appearing before them in court. That same month, Michigan’s Supreme Court issued new 
rules making it harder for justices to hear cases involving major campaign supporters. 
Id. 
 237. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 238. Press Release, supra note 236. 
 239. See id. “[M]omentum is building for public financing of court elections . . . .” Id. 
 240. Glenn R. Winters, Selection of Judges—An Historical Introduction, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1081, 
1082 (1966). “Of these original states, seven provided for selection of judges by the legislature, five by 
governor and council, and one, Delaware, by governor and legislature.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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inevitable that someone would propose popular election of judges, since 
governors and legislators were already being elected. This was not 
particularly designed to improve justice but was simply another 
manifestation of the populism movement.”241 Several states began to 
institute judicial elections only during the nineteenth century.
242
 Georgia 
first began holding elections for lower court judges in 1812, while 
Mississippi became the first state to institute universal judicial elections in 
1832.
243
 These efforts, however, were not entirely successful in many 
states,
244
 and some states soon reverted back to judicial appointment 
systems.
245
 The populist fervor and democratic rationales used by these 
states in the nineteenth century and proponents of judicial elections today, 
however, fundamentally ignore the structure of the American political 
system. “The Constitution did not create a direct democracy; it established 
a constitutional republic. Its goal was to preserve liberty, not to maximize 
popular sovereignty.”246 “An independent judiciary composed of highly 
qualified judges who conscientiously uphold the rule of law is of first 
importance to our constitutional republic.”247  
In order to achieve this independence, we can only allow the judiciary 
to act as virtual representatives of the citizenry rather than active 
representatives of influential interest groups. Permitting elected judiciaries 
injects active representation into judicial decision-making, which in turn 
discourages judicial review of democratically enacted legislation. Indeed, 
the very idea of judicial review, rooted in Marbury v. Madison,
248
 compels 
judges to act only as virtual representatives
249
 of the entire citizenry—
independent of public opinion and the pressures of the political process—
even when doing so compels the court to invalidate a duly passed 
 
 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id.  
 243. Id.  
 244. See id at 1083. “In the 1860’s, the Tammany Hall organization in New York City seized 
control of the elected judiciary and aroused public indignation by ousting able judges and putting in 
incompetent ones.” Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Todd Zywicki & Ilya Somin, Federalism and Separation of Powers: Ramifications of 
Repealing the 17th Amendment, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 88, 88 (2011) (from 
the portion written by Zywicki entitled Repeal the 17th Amendment and Restore the Founders’ 
Design). 
 247. Larry D. Thompson & Charles J. Cooper, The State of the Judiciary: A Corporate 
Perspective, 95 GEO. L.J. 1107, 1108 (2007). 
 248. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 249. Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REV. 
1269, 1294 (2002). “What makes the representation ‘virtual,’ of course, is precisely that ordinary 
mechanisms of political accountability are lacking.” Id. 
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legislative enactment or executive pronouncement.
250
 This idea has proven 
to be a powerful tool against discriminatory legislation.
251
 Because judicial 
elections put judges in an untenable position where truly independent 
judicial review is often not possible, they should be rejected as 
incompatible with our constitutional republic system of governance.  
The Supreme Court’s Chisom decision reinforces the conclusion that 
state judiciaries are quite vulnerable to bias and influence from partisan 
and ideological individuals and groups, moneyed interests, and even self-
interested or politically motivated legislators.
252
 Yet Chisom does not 
speak to the wisdom of judicial elections; it instead only acknowledges 
that when a state chooses to elect judges, those judges are active 
representatives of the voters.
253
 This begets the all-important question—is 
there any way to remove this active representation from judicial elections? 
I think the answer is clearly no. Elected judges will always be subject to 
direct or recall elections, and voters may cast their votes in any manner 
they choose. It would be naïve to assume that voters are constitutionally 
and politically altruistic, and we must acknowledge that most of the 
electorate is unfit to gauge whether a judge has properly acted as a virtual 
 
 
 250. This view has deep historical roots in the common law. See 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 
522 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850) (“As to Acts of Parliament. An act against the Constitution is 
void; an act against natural equity is void; and if an act of Parliament should be made, in the very 
words of this petition, it would be void. The executive Courts must pass such acts into disuse.”); see 
also DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE 23 (2007) (“The Framers found 
intellectual support for this concept in the work of great lawyers such as Sir Edward Coke as well as 
philosophers like Locke. It was Coke who said that ‘when an Act of Parliament is against a common 
right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and 
adjudge such Act to be void.’ Thus, according to Coke, legislation was subject to overriding mandates 
rather than merely the political whim of the majority.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 251. See, e.g., David A. Herman, Juvenile Curfews and the Breakdown of the Tiered Approach to 
Equal Protection, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1857, 1858 (2007). “[T]he Civil Rights Era was characterized by 
rampant de jure discrimination against African Americans. Such discriminatory legislation required 
aggressive judicial review to enforce the mandates of the Reconstruction Amendments against 
reluctant state governments.” Id. Chief Justice Salmon Chase noted that courts are not bound to 
enforce unjust laws, explaining that it “must be a clear case, doubtless, which will warrant a court in 
pronouncing a law so unjust that it ought not to be enforced; but, in a clear case, the path of duty is 
plain.” FARBER, supra note 250, at 49 (internal citation omitted). 
 252. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991). The Chisom Court wrote: 
[I]deally public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge’s role because the judge is often 
called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sentiment. The Framers of the Constitution 
had a similar understanding of the judicial role, and as a consequence, they established that 
Article III judges would be appointed, rather than elected, and would be sheltered from public 
opinion by receiving life tenure and salary protection. Indeed, these views were generally 
shared by the States during the early years of the Republic. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 253. See id. 
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representative of all of the citizenry. It is far too easy to have tunnel vision 
in the voting booth. 
Though many scholars have suggested that public financing of judicial 
elections would provide greater protections against threats to judicial 
independence,
254
 judges will still ultimately be accountable to the people 
in elections and may be tempted to serve as active representatives while 
ruling on cases in ways that increase their electoral viability. Moreover, 
the justification for judicial elections—that they are democratic 
institutions—is undercut by public financing because public financing is a 
fundamentally undemocratic idea. Public funding favors incumbents and 
disadvantages new candidates “by denying to challengers the financial 
resources needed to overcome the advantages of incumbency.”255 
Furthermore, the threat to elected judges cannot be removed by simply 
taking money out of the equation.
256
 Judges should be held accountable to 
the constitutional, statutory, and common law principles that govern our 
constitutional republic. Judges should never be put in a situation where 
they may be tempted to compromise their judicial integrity and 
independence in order to increase their electoral appeal. 
State judiciaries should more closely mirror the federal judiciary, 
where judges may have predisposed political beliefs, but are, for the most 
part, free of the political pressure typical of state judges that must face 
voters at the polls. This would not be a drastic change, and judicial 
appointments would not allow judges free reign to act however they 
please. Even an appointed state judiciary would not be unconstrained from 
ethical standards or political accountability. “Nearly all fifty states have 
 
 
 254. See, e.g., Lauren Ketchum, Former NC Governors Back Public Finance for Judicial 
Elections, GAVELGRAB (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=55774 (last visited July 1, 
2014). Ketchum writes: 
In order to protect North Carolina’s courts from the ‘corrosive influence’ of special interest 
money in judicial races, the state needs to support public financing for appellate court 
candidates. This argument is put forth by former Republican Gov. Jim Holshouser and former 
Democratic Gov. Jim Hunt in a letter to the editor of The (Davidson County) Dispatch. The 
former governors say that judicial elections may require lead candidates to raise large sums of 
campaign money from people who may end up before them in court. 
Id. 
 255. See Robert A. Levy, Public Funding for Judicial Elections: Forget It, CATO INST. (Aug. 13, 
2001), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/public-funding-judicial-elections-forget-it (last 
visited July 1, 2014). “Public funding favors current office-holders by denying to challengers the 
financial resources needed to overcome the advantages of incumbency.” Id. 
 256. Additionally, it would be difficult to prevent independent spending in light of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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constitutional provisions for removal of state judges by impeachment.”257 
The grounds for impeachment of state court judges—such as 
“malfeasance,” “misfeasance,” “gross misconduct,” “gross immorality,” 
“high crimes,” “habitual intemperance,” and “maladministration”258—
reflect accountability only to the ethical and professional standards that 
guide the judiciary, not accountability to the prevailing political ideologies 
of legislators. Reflecting this high standard, “[i]mpeachment is a rarely 
used method of removing judges.”259 Only eight state court judges have 
been involved in impeachment investigations over the last fifteen years, 
with two judges being impeached and only one convicted.
260
 State court 
judges can also be removed for violating state ethics rules.
261
 Some states 
even have comprehensive statutory schemes that provide for the censure, 
suspension, or removal of elected judges.
262
 
 
 
 257. Methods of Removing State Judges, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.ajs.org/judicial-
ethics/impeachment/ (last visited July 1, 2014). 
 258. Id.  
 259. Id.  
 260. Id. 
 261. See, e.g., Max Rivlin-Nadler, West Virginia Judge Suspended After 24 Violations of State’s 
Judicial Ethics Rules, GAWKER (Mar. 30, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://gawker.com/5993043/west-virginia-
judge-suspended-after-24-violations-states-judicial-ethics-rules (last visited July 1, 2014). Rivlin-
Nadler writes: 
Family Court Judge William Watkins III has got a pretty bad temper. He’s been known to yell 
at litigants in his courtroom, as well as on one occasion, calling a woman seeking a protective 
order “stupid.” After word came out about the incident, Watkins told the woman to shut up 
and stop “shooting off [her] fat mouth about what happened.” Unfortunately for Watkins, that 
temper has landed him with a suspension that will last the rest of his term. 
Id. (marks in original). 
 262. For example, North Carolina has a Judicial Standards Commission that consists of: 
[O]ne Court of Appeals judge, two superior court judges, and two district court judges, each 
appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; four members of the State Bar who 
have actively practiced in the courts of the State for at least 10 years, elected by the State Bar 
Council; and four citizens who are not judges, active or retired, nor members of the State Bar, 
two appointed by the Governor, and two appointed by the General Assembly . . . one upon 
recommendation of the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and one upon recommendation 
of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-375(a) (LexisNexis 2013). This diverse administrative body has the authority to 
recommend that the Supreme Court “censure, suspend, or remove any judge for willful misconduct in 
office, willful and persistent failure to perform the judge’s duties, habitual intemperance, conviction of 
a crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the 
judicial office into disrepute.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376(b) (LexisNexis 2013). Numerous judges 
have been removed or censured by the Supreme Court of North Carolina for misconduct. See In re 
Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Ammons), 473 S.E.2d 326, 327 (N.C. 1996) (accepting the Judicial 
Standard Commission’s recommendation that state District Court Judge James F. Ammons, Jr. be 
censured for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brought the judicial office into 
disrepute by acting improperly in a worthless check case where the prosecuting witness was a personal 
friend as well as improperly issuing an ex parte order for the arrest of a noncustodial parent in a child 
custody matter); see also In re Belk, 691 S.E.2d 685 (N.C. 2010) (finding that state District Court 
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Most importantly, public opinion, which is expressed at the voting 
booth, simply cannot reliably indicate whether a judge has been loyal to 
the legal principles of our constitutional republic. For example, directly 
after the United States Supreme Court declared that separate public 
schooling systems for black and white students were unconstitutional in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 55% of Americans reported agreeing with 
the decision, while 40% of respondents disapproved of the decision.
263
 
Only five years later, in 1959, a poll found that “53% of Americans said 
the decision caused a lot more trouble than it was worth.”264 Today, an 
overwhelming percentage of people support the Brown decision as a 
crucial step in ensuring equal protection for all races of people.
265
 Yet, if 
the Warren Court faced a recall election in 1959, the last sixty years of 
constitutional jurisprudence likely would have been vastly different. We 
must remember that legal segregation ended because of the actions of the 
federal judiciary, not through the democratic political process. The 
judiciary provides a place for individuals and groups whose interests are 
not represented in the political process or who are discriminated against by 
discriminatory legislation. If we allow public opinion to influence judicial 
decision-making, we may prevent the next decision like Brown that will be 
universally revered in fifty years, but is opposed by a political majority 
today.
266
  
 
 
Judge William I. Belk should be removed from office for refusing to sever his professional ties by 
stepping down as a corporate board member after being elected to the bench and making false 
statements to the Judicial Standards Commission). 
 263. Joseph Carroll, Race and Education 50 Years after Brown v. Board of Education, GALLUP 
(May 14, 2004), http://www.gallup.com/poll/11686/race-education-years-after-brown-board-education 
.aspx (last visited July 1, 2014).  
 264. Id.  
 265. See id. “Around the 40th anniversary of the ruling, in April 1994, an overwhelming 87% of 
Americans said they approved of the [C]ourt’s decision on this matter.” Id. 
 266. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Gay Rights May Get Its Brown v. Board of Education, NEW 
YORK TIMES (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/opinion/gay-rights-may-get-its-
brown-v-board-of-education.html (last visited July 1, 2014). Klarman writes: 
A Supreme Court ruling in favor of gay marriage would divide the nation roughly down the 
middle, much as the Court’s ruling against racial segregation, in Brown v. Board of 
Education, did in 1954. Yet, within two decades, the Brown decision was almost universally 
revered. A decision protecting same-sex marriage would probably also soon become historic. 
Id. (italics added). 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
Eliminating state judicial elections will certainly be no easy task.
267
 
The dictates of federalism ensure that the federal government cannot 
require states to use appointment systems for selecting judges.
268
 It will 
likely take local grassroots mobilization to put an end to judicial elections, 
but as legal scholars and practitioners, we have the ability to influence the 
political debate that centers on judicial independence and selection. The 
American Bar Association has taken the lead in these efforts, establishing 
the Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary and the Standing 
Committee on Judicial Independence.
269
 “The ABA has long supported 
‘merit’ selection in appointing state-court judges over elections or the 
federal model.”270 “These judges would ideally be immune to removal 
from their positions save for cases of misconduct.”271 While the threat of 
legislative “packing” or “unpacking” of the courts would still remain,272 
 
 
 267. See, for example, the February 6, 2012, remarks of Erwin Chemerinsky, who participated in 
a discussion of Citizens United at the University of California, Irvine, School of Law. Citizens United 
Impact on Judicial Elections, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 685, 688 (2012). Chemerinsky stated: 
So if I could wave a magic wand, I would want to eliminate judicial elections. We could talk 
about what system would be better—and there are many alternatives—but I think the judicial 
elections are inconsistent with what society wants the judiciary to be and inconsistent with 
what we want democracy to be. But the reality is judicial elections are here to stay. In order to 
eliminate judicial elections in a state requires an amendment to the state’s constitution [sic]. 
That requires approval of the voters, and the voters aren’t going to vote themselves out of 
power. They are not going to vote their influence into nonexistence. Efforts to eliminate 
judicial elections have rarely succeeded. There was not long ago such an effort in Nevada. 
Sandra Day O’Connor spent a great deal of time there encouraging the elimination of judicial 
elections and it failed. 
Id.  
 268. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 795 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In 
resolving this case, however, we should refrain from criticism of the State’s choice to use open 
elections to select those persons most likely to achieve judicial excellence. States are free to choose 
this mechanism rather than, say, appointment and confirmation.”). 
 269. Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, AM. BAR ASSOC., http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/justice_center/judicial_independence.html (last visited July 1, 2014); ABA Weighs in on 
Judicial Selection, FEDERALIST SOC’Y L. & PUB. POL’Y STUDS. (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/detail/aba-weighs-in-on-judicial-selection (last visited July 1, 2014) [hereinafter 
ABA Weighs In]. 
 270. ABA Weighs In, supra note 269. 
 271. Id.  
 272. This problem is not unique to state judiciaries, and Congress has the power to change the 
number of justices on the United States Supreme Court, though such an alteration would be almost 
universally disdained as a violation of separation of powers if done for politically-motivated, partisan 
reasons. Nick Robinson, Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and U.S. 
Supreme Courts, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 173, 197 (2013). Robinson writes: 
In 1881, Senator Manning proposed increasing the [United States Supreme] Court’s capacity 
by dividing it into three panels of three judges each, or alternatively having twenty-one judges 
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recent efforts at these measures have been unsuccessful.
273
 “In fact, 
throughout all of [U.S.] history, instances of Court packing, Court 
shrinking, jurisdiction stripping, and impeachment of justices have been 
exceedingly rare.”274 
In future debates over judicial selection systems, we must be mindful 
of the fact that all judicial elections, even when publicly financed, will 
foster representative judges. Although this outcome has some democratic 
appeal, it will strike at the heart of judicial independence and threaten our 
adherence to the constitutional, statutory, and common law principles that 
govern our constitutional republic. We must not be convinced that popular 
sovereignty should govern the judiciary,
275
 for if we cede to the these 
populist calls, we may prevent the next Brown from being decided by our 
courts, while at the same time stunting political progress and the equal 
protection of the laws for all of the citizenry.  
Instead, we must demand judicial independence and virtual 
representation from our state legislators so that one day, if we are the 
citizens oppressed by discriminatory legislation, we can have our day in 
court in front of an impartial and independent judiciary. Indeed, it is a 
heady feeling being in the political majority and having all branches of 
government accountable to your beliefs,
276
 but we must not forget that one 
day the tables may be turned and our only recourse as members of a 
political minority will be in a court of law.
277
 If this day comes, I want the 
 
 
divided into three panels of seven. Along similar lines, in 1890, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee considered increasing the number of justices to eleven or eighteen . . . . 
Id. (citation omitted). “Although unprecedented, and constitutionally undesirable, the Court-packing 
plan [of President Franklin Roosevelt] did not exceed the constitutional powers of the elected 
branches.” Keith E. Whittington, Yet Another Constitutional Crisis?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2093, 
2134 (2002). 
 273. See Cohen, Unpacking, supra note 164. 
 274. Matthew E.K. Hall, Rethinking Regime Politics, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 878, 898 (2012). 
 275. “Legal historians generally associate the movement toward an elected judiciary with the 
ideas of popular sovereignty espoused by the Jacksonian Democrats in the first half of the nineteenth 
century.” John J. Gibbons, The Quality of the Judges Is What Counts in the End, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 
45, 47–48 n.9 (1995).  
 276. But see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The 
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without 
understanding.”). 
 277. See Steven G. Gey, Unity of the Graveyard and the Attack on Constitutional Secularism, 
2004 BYU L. REV. 1005, 1023 (2004). Gey writes: 
The countermajoritarian role of courts in protecting political minorities is compatible with a 
democratic process that is defined by majoritarian control of political power because today’s 
minority might be tomorrow’s majority. By protecting political minorities and the expression 
of minority political sentiments today, the courts are thereby protecting the long-term survival 
of a vivid and flexible system of majority rule. In the end, this means that all policies are 
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judge presiding over my case to have allegiance only to justice and the 
law,
278
 not to the political interests that can ensure his or her reelection.
279
 
 
 
presumptively temporary, and the government may not enshrine any policy or principle as 
unquestioned or sacrosanct. 
Id.  
 278. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis writes: 
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe 
the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for 
ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. . . . If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, 
it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites 
anarchy. 
Id. 
 279. Chief Justice Burger once wrote, a court’s 
individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected 
by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of 
an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to 
an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto. The 
lines ascribed to Sir Thomas More by Robert Bolt are not without relevance here: “The law, 
Roper, the law. I know what’s legal, not what’s right. And I’ll stick with what’s legal. . . . I’m 
not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find such plain-sailing, I 
can’t navigate, I’m no voyager. But in the thickets of the law, oh there I’m a forester. . . . 
What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil? . . . And when 
the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you—where would you hide, Roper, the 
laws all being flat? . . . This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to coast—Man’s 
laws, not God’s—and if you cut them down . . . d’you really think you could stand upright in 
the winds that would blow then? . . . Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own 
safety’s sake.’ 
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194–95 (1978) (quoting ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL 
SEASONS, in THREE PLAYS 147 (Heinemann 1967)). 
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